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TOWARD THE INTEGRATION OF
CANADIAN AND UNITED STATES
NATURAL GAS IMPORT POLICIES
Dennis C. Stickley*
As the United States and Canada move to deregulate the
naturalgas market, economic forces will begin to determine supply and demand levels of naturalgas. In a two-part article, the
authordiscusses the two countries' efforts to integrate their natural gas importpolicies. The first part,printed at 25 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 145 (1990), dealt with the background of the United States
and Canadiannaturalgas policies, the countries' differingperspectives on the naturalgas market, and the legal and institutional environment in the United States. The secondpart,printed
here, deals with the legal and institutionalenvironment in Canada, the U.S.-CanadaFree Trade Agreement, and issues for the
future of the cross-national naturalgas market.
V.

THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN CANADA

In order to understand the procedure for exporting Canadian natural
gas, it is helpful to review the Canadian statutory and administrative
framework developed for this purpose. Stated briefly, this framework
represents a synthesis between market forces and governmental policy.
During the past decade a transformation in economic regulation
of natural gas exports has taken place. After record export levels, which
exceeded 100 billion cubic feet (BCF) in some years in the 1970s, the
volume of natural gas exported from Canada to the United States went
into a steady decline.' At this juncture, federal and provincial
govern2
ments embarked upon a deliberate course of deregulation.
*General Counsel, Petrocorp Group, Wellington, New Zealand.
1. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL ENERGY ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, U.S.-CANADA

GAS TRADE REVIEW 8 (Nov. 1987).
2. NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, A REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND OPERATIONS OF INTERPROVINCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL PIPELINES IN CANADA ENGAGED IN THE BUYING, SELLING
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The cornerstone of this effort came in the form of the intergovernmental Western Accord between the national government and the major
natural gas producing provinces.' The unilateral federal decontrol of
natural gas exports reached its culmination in September 1987, when
the National Energy Board removed the requirement that exporting
Canadian producers maintain a fifteen year gas supply reserve for
domestic use before approval would be given for exports to the United
States.4 This institutional transition, as well as the details of the current regulatory scheme, are discussed in the following sections.
A. The National Energy Board Act
Administrative authority for the control and approval of natural
gas exports is derived from enabling legislation adopted by the Canadian Parliament on November 2, 1959 in the form of the National
Energy Board Act (NEBA).5 This statute created the National Energy
Board (NEB), on whose behalf the Minister of Energy, Mines, and
Resources reports to Parliament.'
The NEB functions in both a regulatory and advisory capacity.' In
fulfilling its advisory role, the NEB studies and reviews matters under
the jurisdiction of the national government that concern:
[T]he exploration for production, recovery, manufacture, processing, transmission, transportation, distribution, sale, purchase,
exchange, and disposal 8of energy and sources of energy within
and outside of Canada.

The NEB has an equally broad array of regulatory authority over
natural gas transmission. Pipeline construction must be done under
Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity when they connect
a province with another province or "extend beyond the limits of a
province. ' Pipeline rates, or "tolls," are subject to NEB approval as
well."°
The control of natural gas exports is administered by the NEB
through a licensing system. NEBA provides in pertinent part:
AND TRANSMISSION OF NATURAL GAS, PIPELINE REVIEW PANEL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
CLAUSE 25 OF THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA, ALBERTA,BRITISH
COLUMBIA AND SASKATCHEWAN ON NATURAL GAS MARKETS AND PRICES OF 31 OCTOBER

1985 at 3 (June 1986).

3. Id.
4. See generally, NATIONAL

ENERGY BOARD, REASONS FOR DECISION IN THE MATTER OF: REVIEW OF NATURAL GAS SURPLUS DETERMINATION PROCEDURES (July 1987).

5. National Energy Board Act, R.S.C. ch. 46 (1959).

6. Id.
7. Hodgson, Digest of MineralLaws of Canada,Mineral Report No. 13, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, MINES, AND NATURAL RESOURCES (1967).

8. R.S.C. ch. 46, § 22.
9. Id. § 25.
10. Id. §§ 50, 61.
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Gas and Power
Except as provided in the regulations, no person shall export
any gas or power or import any gas except under the authority
of and in accordance with a license issued under this part.
Issue of Licenses
(1) Subject to the regulations, the Board may issue licenses upon
such terms and conditions as are prescribed by the regulations,
(a) for the exportation of power or gas.
Construction of the pipeline system for transporting natural gas
licensed for export must also be done under a NEB certificate. 2 The
EBA establishes the following factors to be considered in such approvals:
1. The availability of natural gas;
2. existing or potential markets;
3. opportunity for Canadian participation in financing, engineering, and construction; and
4. whether the project is in the public interest."
Upon receiving an application for an export license, the NEB

reviews all considerations that appear to be relevant to its decision.
NEBA criteria for making this determination are as follows:
(a) [T]he quantity of gas or power to be exported does not exceed
the surplus remaining after due allowance has been made for
the reasonably foreseeable requirements for use in Canada; and
(b) the price to be charged by an applicant for gas or power
exported 14by him is just and reasonable in relation to the public
interest.

The NEB adopted specific regulations implementing NEBA policy
for approving export applications.' Under the NEB's Part IV Regulations, an applicant for an export license is required to submit a list
of information in support of its application, including:
1. The number of years for which the application is made;
2. the annual, maximum daily, and total quantity of gas to be
exported;
3. market requirements in Canada and outside of the country for
domestic, commercial and industrial use both on a firm and interruptible basis;
11. Id. §§ 81, 82.
12. Id. § 44.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. National Energy Board Part IV Regulations, CAN.
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4. copies of sales and export contracts;
5. a summary of gas quantities purchased and the location of
reserves;
6. evidence of removal authorization from provincial authorities;
7. evidence that the export volumes are surplus to Canadian
requirements; and
8. the route, design, and capacity of the pipeline systems transporting the gas.' 6
Orders approving exports are issued upon terms and conditions set at
the NEB's discretion. 17 Authorizations are usually effective for up to
twenty-four months,
but small transactions may be approved for a period
8
of twenty years.'
Current long-term approvals are subject to rules that state:
(a) [T]he order shall be granted subject to condition that the
price to be charged for gas reported under the order shall not
be less than the price to Canadians for similar types of service
in the area or zone adjacent to the point of export;
(b) the order shall not come into force until the person authorized by that order has filed with the Board, proof of authorization to move the gas outside the province in which the gas is
produced, extracted, recovered or manufactured. 9
If the contract is for a period of more than one month, it must include
a provision permitting its termination if the exports are restricted by
the Canadian government.2" Exporting pipelines or producers previously had to show the NEB that they had a fifteen-year gas supply adequate for projected domestic needs before the requested export could
be executed.2'
Since Canada is a federation, national and provincial governments
have overlapping jurisdiction in the regulation of natural resources.2 2
The major energy resources are owned by the province, with federal
at § 4.
at § 8.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

21.

NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, REASONS FOR DECISION, IN THE MATTER OF: PHASE 1,

at § 8(3).
at § 4(a).

THE SURPLUS DETERMINATION PROCEDURES PHASE OF THE GAS EXPORT OMNIBUS HEARING

(April, 1986):
A Reserves : Production ratio (R/P) of 15 was selected because it would
provide a minimum period of two - three years of level production before

the productive capacity of the Western Canada Sedimentary Basin would
commence to decline. Previously, the 25 Al Reserves Formula adopted
by the NEB in May 1982 required 25 times the current year's Canadian
demand.

Id. at 4, 74, 79.
22. Hodgson, supra note 7 at 41.
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PoLicmS3

powers controlling prices and volumes of energy sales between provincial or export markets." Federal authority over interprovincial and
export trade was granted under Canada's constitution.24 Although the
provinces cannot directly regulate this trade, they heavily influence
gas trade through the issuance of removal permits.25 In the face of this
shared jurisdiction, gas pricing has been worked out through a series
of negotiations in the 1970s and 1980s between the federal government
producing provinces of Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchand the
26
ewan.
In order to set the level of exports, the NEB employed both a
"Reserves Test of Formula" from 1960 to 1986 and a "Deliverability
Test of Appraisal" between 1979 and 1986.17 The "Reserves Formula"
set aside an amount of established reserves equal to twenty-five times
the current year's domestic demand, plus the maximum volumes that
could flow under existing export licenses. Excess volumes were deemed
surplus and thus available for export. The multiple of twenty-five related
principally to the term of export licenses issued in the NEB's early years,
when lengthy license terms were required in order to finance new pipeline facilities.28 The "Deliverability Appraisal" compared the NEB's
best estimate of future natural gas supply and demand on a year-toyear basis. The supply and demand information used in the appraisal
included supply from established reserves, estimated future reserve
additions, and expected Canadian requirements as well as estimated
exports
under existing licenses (i.e., the export volumes expected to
29

flow).

B. Administrative Decontrol
It is significant that the decontrol of Canadian natural gas exports
was achieved without amending NEBA. However, a recent intergovernmental panel has suggested statutory changes because:
The need to amend pricing regulations and to obtain an order
from the National Energy Board to accommodate each new purchase and sale transaction are unnecessary impediments in a
market-oriented system.2
23. The three major natural gas producing provinces are Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan. NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, NATURAL GAS MARKET ASSESSMENT
at 17-19 (Oct. 1988).
24. CANADA CONST., art. VI, § 91, cl. 2; 92A (1867, amended 1949).

25.

NATIONAL ENERGY

BOARD,

MEMORANDUM TO ALL EXPORT LICENSE HOLDERS:

REGULATORY PROCEDURES AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR APPLICANTS FOR CHANGES
TO EXISTING NATURAL GAS EXPORTS SALES CONTRACTS AND LICENSES (Oct. 2, 1984).

26. IN THE MATTER OF: PHASE 1, THE SURPLUS DETERMINATION PROCEDURES PHASE
OF THE GAS EXPORT OMNIBus HEARING, supra note 21 at 69-75.

DIAN

27. Id. at 25.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER &
PERSPECTIVE at 1 (Oct. 1985).
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NEBA was amended under a consolidation which revised the section
numbering."' Most recently, NEBA was amended to reflect the adoption of the Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade ImplementationAct.2 These
changes are intended to give the NEB authority under Article 904 of
the Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) to only impose restriction on the exportation of energy goods going to the United States under narrow conditions. " The current state of administrative deregulation was largely
achieved in a sequence of four steps. These milestones are discussed
in the following sections.
1. Directly Negotiated Prices
The first breakthrough came in the key pricing arena. Export applications had always required specific NEB price approvals.' A dichotomy
existed under former NEB policy because even though the actual volume
of natural gas exported declined dramatically between 1979 and 1984,
the total quantity of natural gas authorized for export under existing
long-term arrangements actually increased. 5 As a departure from this
practice, in July, 1984, the NEB announced it would eliminate the
requirement that border prices be uniform, and would approve export
contracts which were executed on the basis of negotiated contract
prices.3 6 Under this declaration the NEB would approve a long-term
negotiated export price if the applicant could make several showings.
First, the contract price had to be sufficient to recover an appropriate
share of fixed costs incurred. Second, the export price could not be
below the wholesale price at the Toronto City-gate. 8 Third, the price
could not be lower than that of major competing energy sources (primarily natural gas) in the United States. 9 Fourth, the contract had to
include provisions which would account for changing market conditions
during the term of the contract.4 0 Fifth, the contract needed to contain
provisions that provided reasonable assurances that the volumes committed under the contract would be taken. 41 Sixth, producers supplying the natural gas to be exported needed to endorse the conditions
of the original agreement and any subsequent revisions.4 2 Finally, exist31. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 46 §§ 1911.1-1911.5.

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. U.S.-CANADA
35. Id.
36.

NATIONAL

GAS TRADE REVIEW,

ENERGY

BOARD,

supra note 1, at 28.

REGULATORY

PROCEDURES AND

INFORMATIONAL

REQUIREMENTS FOR APPLICANTS FILING FOR CHANGES TO EXISTING NATURAL GAS EXPORT
CONTRACTS AND LICENSES (Oct. 2, 1984) at 2. The uniform border price was originally

sought by the United States in order to remedy overpricing of Canadian exports. Canada

Mouing to CaptureBigger Slice of U.S. Gas Market, On. & GAS J. at 57, 58 (Jan. 28, 1985).
37.

REGULATORY PROCEDURES AND INFORMATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR APPLICANTS

FILING FOR CHANGES TO EXISTING NATURAL GAS EXPORT CONTRACTS AND LICENSES,

supra

note 36 at 3.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 4.

40. Id.
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id. at 2.
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ing contracts that were renegotiated under the new policy had43to demonstrate that the economic return to Canada was enhanced.
Significantly, several criteria were established for short-term sales
contracts for the first time.44 The following factors were applied by the
NEB in approving sales in the emerging spot market:
1. The previously discussed factors for negotiated long-term contracts had to be met;
2. the contract term could not exceed 24 months;
3. total export volumes could not exceed 106 BCF;
4. all short-term sales had to be incremental and could not displace
exports moving under long-term licenses; and
5. sales would be made on a best-efforts interruptible basis so as
not to preempt the potential for long-term contracts or to commit pipeline capacity.45
2. The Western Accord
The next and most significant step in decontrol came through interaction between Canadian federal and provincial governments. On
March 29, 1985 the Western Accord between the governments of
Canada, Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan was announced.4 6
This landmark agreement covered issues concerning the pricing and
taxation of oil and natural gas by the signatory bodies. At the time
it was seen as the Canadian decontrol equivalent of the United States
Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA).47 The Western Accord's most significant features as they concerned natural gas exports are discussed in
the following sections.
Naturalgas deregulation.Originally, a natural gas deregulation
scheme was scheduled to be implemented on November 1, 1985, by
replacing the Toronto wholesale price floor with regional price references. 48 However, Canadian Energy Minister Pat Carney placed the
onus on the industry to devise a market-oriented pricing policy that
would be acceptable to all parties involved-producers, pipelines, distributors, consumers, and local government agencies as well as the
Canadian federal government.4 9 Under the new policy, as of Novem43. Id.
4 (March 1, 1985).

44.

NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, REGULATORY AGENDA at

45.

REGULATORY PROCEDURES AND INFORMATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR APPLICANTS

FLING FOR CHANGES TO EXISTING NATURAL GAS EXPORT CONTRACTS AND LICENSES,

supra

note 36 at 2.
46. THE WESTERN

ACCORD, AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA,
ALBERTA, SASKATCHEWAN AND BRITISH COLUMBIA ON OIL AND GAS PRICING AND TAXATION

(March 25, 1985).
47. Canada Moving to Capture Bigger Slice of the U.S. Gas Market, supra note
36 at 62.
48. REASONS FOR DECISION, IN THE MATTER OF: PHASE 1, THE SURPLUS DETERMINATION PROCEDURES PHASE OF THE GAS EXPORT OMNIBUS HEARING, supra note 21 at 3.

49.

THE WESTERN ACCORD,

supra note 46 at 1.
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ber 1, 1986, the price of natural gas exported to a certain region of the
United States must not exceed that paid by Canadians "living in the
area or zone adjacent to the export point."5 A regionalized pricing procedure, for example, requires that exports at Niagara Falls, Ontario would
be compared to the Toronto price (the former national standard) while
natural gas entering at Kingsgate, Del Bonita or Monchy would track
the price in Calgary, and gas brought in from British Columbia at
Sumas or East Port would be referenced at the rates for Vancouver.
Fiscal measures. Perhaps one of the most important parts of the
Western Accord is the removal of a number of fiscal impediments to
the Canadian energy industry's recovery. In order to help stimulate
investment in the oil and gas industry, the Canadian federal government agreed to remove numerous taxes or charges implemented by the
Liberal government, including the Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax,
the Canadian Ownership Special Charge, export charges on crude oil
and crude oil products, the Petroleum Compensation Charge, and the
Petroleum Gas and Revenue Tax.51
Provincialfiscal restraint.An important facet of the Western Accord
was the pledge of the provincial governments to allow the benefits
resulting from the agreement to reach the Canadian oil and gas industry. This was done to ensure that a series of new taxes and royalties
would not be adopted. 2
3. Agreement on Markets and Prices
Shortly after the Western Accord was adopted, another intergovernmental agreement was signed and became the third step in the fourpart decontrol process.5" This agreement was effective on November
1, 1985. The policy of the national government and the three major
natural gas producing provinces was revised to permit domestic natural
prices to be set through negotiation between buyers and
gas sales
54
sellers.
Export sales were also affected by this agreement. First, the government of Canada, through the NEB, amended its policy for export license
approval to only require satisfaction of the following "Criteria of Acceptability":
1. The price of exported gas must recover its appropriate share of
incurred costs;
2. the price of exported natural gas could not be less than the prices
charge to Canadians for similar types of service in the area adjacent
to the export point;
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id. at 7.
53. AGREEMENT

AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA, ALBERTA,BRITISH COLUMBIA AND SASKATCHEWAN ON NATURAL GAS MARKETS AND PRIcES (October 31, 1985).

54. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol25/iss2/5

8

Stickley: Toward the Integration of Canadian and United States Natural Gas

1990

INTEGRATION OF NATURAL GAS IMPORT POLICIES

343

3. export contracts had to contain provisions to permit adjustments
according to changes in market conditions;
4. exporters had to give reasonable assurances that contract
volumes would be taken; and
5. exporters had to demonstrate that gas producers supplying gas
for export endorse the terms of the contract and its subsequent amendments. 5
An additional commitment was made by Ottawa for the appointment of an impartial panel to conduct an "all encompassing review
of the role and operations of interprovincial and international pipelines
engaged in the buying, selling and transmission of gas."5 6 The Pipeline Review Panel submitted its report to the Minister of Energy, Mines
and Natural Resources on July 3, 1986."7
The Pipeline Review Panel's report discussed the fundamental considerations in formulating policy transitions toward market-oriented
pricing and advanced a schedule of timing for the changes that it recommended be made. The report recommended that pipeline tariffs, governmental policies and contract renegotiations be undertaken by November 1, 1986, to remove impediments to a market-oriented system. 58 The
report compared the Canadian situation with that experienced in the
United States and found that Canadian deregulation was "moving
faster to a market-oriented pricing scheme" and that the lack of complete decontrol in the United States was "causing marketing difficulexposing Canadian pipelines and
ties for Canadian exporters and
59
producers to increased risks.
4. Surplus Procedures Review
Following the report of the Pipeline Review Panel, the NEB
announced it had decided that its reserve to production (R/P) calculation procedure was no longer consistent with the new free market
environment to which the Western Accord and subsequent policy
changes had been intended to respond." A new natural gas surplus
determination policy was announced in July, 1987, after extensive hearings before the NEB in Ottawa, Calgary, and Toronto in April and May
of 1987.61 This became the fourth and final step in the decontrol of
natural gas exports.
55. Id.
56. A REVIEW

OF THE ROLE AND OPERATIONS OF INTERPROVINCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL

PIPELINES IN CANADA ENGAGED IN THE BUYING, SELLING AND TRANSMISSION OF NATURAL

GAS, supra note 2 at 3.

57. Id.
58. Id. at 28.
59. Id. at 23.
60. REASONS FOR

DECISION, IN THE MATTER OF: PHASE 1, THE SURPLUS DETERMINATION PROCEDURES PHASE OF THE GAS EXPORT OMNIBUS HEARING, supra note 21 at 23.

61.

REASONS FOR DECISION, IN THE MATTER OF: REvIEw OF NATURAL GAS SURPLUS

DETERMINATION PROCEDURES,

supra note 4 at 2.
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After finding that "the current national energy policy framework
is based on the premise that the marketplace determines the supply,
demand, and price for natural gas," the NEB rejected an alternative
proposal that used revisions to the R/P procedure as well as a return
to the "Reserves Formula" and "Deliverability Procedure. '62 The NEB
determined that the new market-based procedure was consistent with
negotiated pricing and that allocating gas reserves under any formula
approach would only interfere with market functioning. 3
The NEB will continue to conduct oversight of market activity.
Natural gas supply, demand and prices will be monitored and assessments will be made public in the CanadianEnergy Supply and Demand,
which was first published in 1986 and formed the basis for the export
Gas Market Assessments that are
surplus reevaluation, and in Natural
64
issued on a more frequent basis.
C. Spot Market Application Proceedings
Canadian producers faced the same dilemma as our domestic marketers in their attempt to participate in United States spot marketsthe fastest growing segment of the industry. Because the lead time
needed to gain approval for each transaction submitted under the original surplus determination procedures was about six months, it was
nearly impossible for Canadian natural gas to compete effectively.
The NEB has now implemented a highly streamlined program utilizing self-implementing, blanket export licenses for spot sales with
authorization periods which do not exceed two years.6 5 Reporting under
the blanket license is now on an after-the-fact basis and is usually done
monthly for sales made in the preceding month.6 Additionally, the NEB
annually conducts performance reviews through its NaturalGas Market Assessments and CanadianEnergy Supply and Demand reports to
determine whether exporters are fully utilizing the capacity granted
by the license. The 1985 restriction limiting short-term export volumes
Additionally, the NEB
to 106 BCF has also been eliminated.6
announced that its policy would be to "turn around" short-term applications within seventy-two hours of their receipt. 8 If the contemplated
export exceeds the limits of the self-implementing procedures, as is
likely in the case of a long-term supply contract, a license must be
and monitoring process now
secured through a combined export hearing
' 69
termed the "market-based procedure.
62.
63.
64.
Surplus
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 26. The first Natural Gas Market Assessment after the change in the
Procedures was issued in October, 1988.
NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, REGULATORY AGENDA at 4 (Sept. 1, 1988).
Id.
REASONS FOR DECISION, IN THE MATTER OF: PHASE

1,

THE SURPLUS DETERMINA-

TION PROCEDURES PHASE OF THE GAS EXPORT OMNIBUS HEARING,

supra note 21 at 18-20.

68. Id. at 26.

69. REASONS FOR DECISION IN THE MATTER OF REVIEW OF NATURAL GAS SURPLUS
DETERMINATION PROCEDURES, supra note 4 at 1.
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1. Application Content
An applicant for a short-term export license now must show the
following:
1. The names of the exporter and importer;
2. the expected commencement date and duration of the export;
3. the selling price at the international border;
4. the export point; and
5. whether an executed sales agreement exists.7"
If a contract does not exist, an executed copy of the sales agreements
must be filed within thirty days of the NEB order.7 ' The NEB will treat
the price and related contractual matters as confidential for a period
of ninety days from the issuance of an export order to protect the market position of the applicant. 2
2. Pricing
In the past, the export price was compared to the sum of TransCanada Pipeline's Eastern Zone rate for contract demand service at
a 100 percent of base load. Other pricing components included the Canadian ownership special charge, and the natural gas and gas liquids tax,
less the federal subsidy of TransCanada Pipeline's transportation "tolls"
(i.e., rates)."
As with previous Canadian export policy, price undoubtedly is the
most important factor in obtaining NEB approval. The sophisticated
pricing provisions being negotiated, however, make it difficult to establish the price at which gas actually will be sold under new or renegotiated contracts because the contract price often is a function of a variety of factors, most notably volumes, that cannot be predicted with
certainty in advance.
The minimum border price now is established by comparing the
proposed annual average price at the expected load factor with the
equivalent load factor wholesale price paid by a Canadian distributor
in the franchise area nearest the point of export." The NEB now sees
its role as "ascertaining whether Canadians can buy gas proposed for
export on similar terms and conditions, including price, as can export
customers."7"
70. REGULATORY PROCEDURES AND INFORMATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR APPLICANTS
FILING FOR CHANGES TO EXISTING NATURAL GAS EXPORT CONTRACTS AND LICENSES, supra
note 36.
71. REASONS FOR DECISION IN THE MATTER OF: REVIEW OF NATURAL GAS SURPLUS
DETERMINATION PROCEDURES, supra note 4 at 8.
72. NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, REGULATORY AGENDA at 7 (Sept. 1, 1986).

73.

REASONS FOR DECISION IN THE MATTER OF: REVIEW OF NATURAL GAS SURPLUS

DETERMINATION PROCEDURES, supra note 4 at 12.
74. A REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND OPERATIONS OF INTERPROVINCIAL PIPELINES IN CANADA

ENGAGED IN THE BUYING, SELLING AND TRANSMISSION OF NATURAL

GAS, supranote 2 at 9.

75. Id.
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The change in calculating the minimum export price has two main
implications. First, the use of nearby prices will reduce substantially
the price for exports from adjacent areas of the two countries. Second,
the use of the same load factor for comparison probably will result in
the reverse effect, particularly where service is rendered pursuant to
two-part (demand/commodity) rates. In the past, the expected export
load factor usually was much less than 100 percent and, accordingly,
the unit price for comparison purposes was greater. This methodology
resulted in a greater per-unit rate for the export than if the 100 percent load factor rate was used. This, in turn, made it easier for a lower
actual border price to be approved. If the expected load factor was
exceeded, the result was lower per-unit prices. A second NEB price
criterion had been that the price must result in prices in the United
States market that are at least equal to the price of major competing
energy sources.76 This factor has been eliminated in the Surplus Redetermination Procedure. 7 The applicable area price can be determined by
reference to the export points shown in Table 1.
The NEB has demonstrated its intention to enforce this criteria.
In May 1986, the NEB issued cease and desist orders suspending furwhen
ther exports under short term orders by individual license holders 78
prices fell below those prevailing where the export took place.
3. Volumes
In order to avoid problems with the operation of minimum bills
under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Order No. 380 and to
ensure that contracted volumes will be taken, the NEB previously
required short-term sales to include "contractual assurances" that
"reasonable efforts" would be made to take gas offered by the seller. 9
This requirement has also been eliminated.8
For long-term orders, an ostensibly higher standard still applies:
There must be "some form of assurance that the U.S. importer will
take the quantities proposed to be exported."'" This includes some provision to ensure the minimum revenue stream when contracts require
to provide an underpinning
the construction of new facilities, in order
8 2
on which to finance such new facilities.
Parties to short-term export contracts responded to the "contractual assurance" requirement in a variety of ways. Some short-term
76. Id.
77. REASONS

FOR DECISION IN THE MATTER OF: REVIEW OF NATURAL GAS SURPLUS
DETERMINATION PROCEDURES, supra note 4 at 8.
NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, REGULATORY AGENDA at 6 (June 1, 1986).
AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA, ALBERTA, BRITISH COLUMBIA AND SASKATCHEWAN ON NATURAL GAS MARKETS AND PRICES, supra note 53 at 8.

78.
79.

80. REASONS FOR DECISION IN THE MATTER OF: REVIEW OF NATURAL GAS SURPLUS
DETERMINATION PROCEDURES, supra note 4 at 4.
81. A REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND OPERATIONS OF INTERPROVINCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PIPELINES IN CANADA ENGAGED IN THE BUYING, SELLING, AND TRANSMISSION OF NATURAL

GAS, supra note 2 at 16-17.
82. Id.
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Export Point
Huntington, B.C.
Kingsgate, B.C.
Aden, Alberta
Cardston, Alberta
Monchy, Saskatchewan
Emerson, Manitoba
Sprague, Manitoba
Fort Frances, Ontario
Niagara Falls, Ontario
Windsor, Ontario
Cornwall, Ontario
Phillipsburg, Quebec

Note: Price monitoring is largely conducted by
provincial authorities based upon prices set
by Removal Permit conditions and after-thefact monitoring by the NEB.

Table

1. Area Price Comparisons for Canadian
Exports

Source: National Energy Board, Ottawa, Ontario.
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exports required the purchaser to buy all its requirements pursuant
3
to the export contract; others were keyed to partial requirements." Still
others used stated volumes or simply required that "best efforts" be
5
used on both sides. 4 A monthly nomination system also was used.
Actual exports as a percentage of authorized volumes has been between
50 percent and 60 percent.8 6 Approximately 70 percent of volumes actu87
ally transported have moved under long-term licenses.
On October 17, 1986, the NEB decided to consider extending initial export approvals made in 1983, which contained so-called "sunset
clauses," as a condition of the license.8 8 Unless extended or deleted from
the approval by the NEB the license would expire at the end of its term.
Furthermore, due to the build up of approved short-term exports on
May 29, 1987, the NEB ruled that export authorizations will expire
unless actual exports are made within six months of the date of
approval.8 9 Finally, there appears to be a shift from some short-term
to long-term authorizations. Canadian gas supplies are being contracted
9
for use in new United States co-generation facilities. "
D. Provincial Permits
In addition to NEB approval, parties seeking to export gas from
Canada must secure a removal permit from the province in which the
gas was produced.9 The three major producing provinces have adopted
different approaches.
Alberta will not issue provincial permits to end-users it considers
92
more appropriately served by long-term contracts.
Under Saskatchewan's permit procedures, prices paid for gas leaving
the province must not be lower than those paid by provincial consumers
for similar types of sales. 3 Furthermore, removal permits will not be
issued for sales that displace Saskatchewan volumes that are currently
under contract.94

83. NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD,
NATION PROCEDURE (Sept. 9, 1987).

84. A REVIEW

NEB ADOPTS

NEW NATURAL GAS SURPLUS DETERMI-

OF THE ROLE AND OPERATIONS OF INTERPROVINCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL

PIPELINES IN CANADA ENGAGED IN THE BUYING, SELLING AND TRANSMISSION OF NATURAL

GAS,

supra note 2 at 10.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87.

REASONS FOR DECISION IN THE MATTER OF: PHASE 1,

THE

SURPLUS DETERMINA-

TION PROCEDURES PHASE OF THE GAS EXPORT OMNIBUS HEARING, supra note 21 at 22-23.
88. NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, REGULATORY AGENDA at 7 (March 1, 1987).
89. NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, REGULATORY AGENDA at 6 (June 1, 1987).
90. NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, REGULATORY AGENDA at 2-3 (March 1, 1989).
91. REASONS FOR DECISION IN THE MATTER OF: REVIEW OF NATURAL GAS SURPLUS
DETERMINATION PROCEDURES,

supra note 4 at 18.

92. Id.
93. Id. at 19.

94. Id.
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Removal permit conditions in British Columbia require that prices
charged for gas removed from the province not be lower than prices
paid by British Columbia customers in the market area adjacent to the
export point. 5 Contracts for gas removal must also have similar terms
and conditions as those used in provincial service. 9
E. Timetable for NEB Approvals
The NEB has set forth a schedule it hopes to keep in approving
export applications. If the NEB adheres to the published schedule, it
is possible that an NEB long-term license approval can be secured as
soon as six weeks.9 7 Governor-in-Council approval may take another
two weeks. 98 Short-term export orders can now be secured in three working days if the application is complete at the time of filing."
VI. THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

The previous discussion has demonstrated that, through deregulation, relatively free trade in natural gas has existed since 1984." ° ° Prior
to the adoption of the FTA, both the United States and Canada had
become each others' largest trading partner.'' Moreover, this level of
commerce is the world's largest bilateral trade relationship." 2 Both
Canadians and Americans saw the adoption of the Free Trade Agreement as a formalization of the status quo. 0 3 In its summary of the FTA,
the Office of the United States Trade Representative did not discuss
the energy provisions of the agreement." 4 Nevertheless, natural gas
trade was the subject of extensive discussion in the energy review
group. 5 Although there were no immediate or dramatic impacts on
natural gas trade, regulatory stability under the FTA should help
eliminate uncertainty from the market place and makes this subject
one for further evaluation.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Telephone interview with Dennis Dubuc, Chief, Gas Policy Application, Gas
& Oil Division, National Energy Board (April 24, 1989).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. MINISTRY OF ENERGY, MINES AND RESOURCES, THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE

AGREEMENT AND ENERGY (1987); Buckley & Grammer, Gas Trade With Canada:Break-

ing Down Barriers at the Border, 2 NAT. GAS. LAW J. 24, 36-37 (1988).
101. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, BACKGROUND ON U.S.-CANADA ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP (Oct. 4, 1987).

Trade with Canada represents 24 percent of U.S. exports and 18 percent of total imports.
Trade with the United States accounts for 70 percent of Canadian imports and 78 percent of exports. Id. at 3.
102. Interview with R.A. Reinstein, Director, Energy and Natural Resources, Office
of the United States Trade Representative, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 22, 1987).
103. Id.
104. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, SUMMARY OF THE TRADE AGREEMENT (Oct. 4, 1987).

105. Interview with Andrea K. Waldman, International Economist, Office of International Affairs, United States Deptartment of Energy, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 21,
1987).
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Basically, a free trade area is a combination of two or more countries in which tariffs, non-tariff restrictions, and other trade distortions
are eliminated for most trade sectors. Prior to negotiations with Canada,
the United States had established a free trade area only with Israel.',
A. Negotiation Authority
Section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to
negotiate agreements on bilateral trade areas and to have them considered by the Congress on a "fast track" basis. 107 That authority was
scheduled to expire on midnight, January 2, 1980, but was extended
for another eight years by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.1°8
In order for an agreement to be eligible for fast track consideration, two key conditions must be met: (1) The negotiations must be
requested by the foreign country; and (2) the President must provide
advance notice to the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee. 10 9
Interested parties in the private sector participate in developing
U.S. negotiating objectives through Trade Policy Committees and lower
level review groups. The committees include representatives from industry, agriculture, labor, consumers, and the general public."" These committees report to the President through the Office of the United States
Trade Representative and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce,
and Labor." 1
1. Fast Track Procedures
Once negotiations are underway, several other steps must be taken
if the agreement is to be considered under fast track procedures. First,
the President is required to consult with Congress. Second, the President must notify Congress of the Administration's intention to enter
an agreement ninety days before doing so. Third, after entering an
agreement, the President must submit the agreement to Congress,
together with a draft of the implementing bill, a statement of any
administrative action needed to implement the agreement, an explanation of how the bill or agreement changes or affects existing law,
and a statement of reasons why the agreement serves the interests of
United States commerce."2 Collectively, these documents are referred
to as the "FTA package."
106. The United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub.
L. No. 99-47, 99 Stat. 82 (1985).
107. 19 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1988). The FTA package includes the agreement signed
by the heads-of-state as well as policy justification, implementing legislation and regulatory changes. Id.
108. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
109. 19 U.S.C. § 2112(c) (1988).
110. 15 C.F.R. § 2002.0 (1988).
111. Id.
112. 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988).
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The implementing bill is introduced in both houses of Congress and
referred to the jurisdictional committees on the same day."' The principal committees with jurisdiction are the House Ways and Means and
the Senate Finance Committees. The bill also could be referred to the
Energy, Agriculture, Commerce, Foreign Affairs, and Banking Committees.11 4 The committees have forty-five legislative days in which to
report the bill after which they are discharged automatically from further consideration."1

Each House votes on the bill within fifteen legislative days after
the measure has been received from the standing committees. 116 Amendments are not in order."' A simple majority of each House is required
for acceptance."'
2. Chronology of Negotiations
In March of 1985, at the so-called "Shamrock Summit," President
Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney asked their trade
officials to explore ways to reduce or eliminate existing barriers to trade
between the United States and Canada." 9 The two heads-of-state formally requested that the United States and Canada explore the potential for negotiating a comprehensive free trade agreement on September 26, 1985.12° The Canadian Prime Minister announced his intention
to conduct negotiations for "the broadest possible package of mutually
beneficial reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers between the two
countries.""1 1
President Reagan formally notified the Senate Finance and the
House Ways and Means Committees on December 10, 1985, of his intent
to enter bilateral negotiations with Canada using fast track provisions. 1 22 On April 23, 1986, the Senate Finance Committee narrowly
granted fast track authority for the trade negotiations when a resolution to deny the authority failed on a ten to ten vote.' 2 '
United States and Canadian negotiators met for the first time on
May 21, 1986, in Ottawa. 24 Subsequently, President Reagan and Prime
Minister Mulroney reiterated their commitment to the trade talks during their meeting in Canada in April of 1987.12 They agreed that a

free trade arrangement between the countries would be an opportu113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S.-CANADA GAs TRADE REVIEW, supra note 1 at 20.
BACKGROUND ON U.S.-CANADA ECONOMIc RELATIONSHIP, supra note 101.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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nity to provide benefits for American and Canadian consumers and businesses.'2 6
President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney signed the FTA
on January 2, 1988, and submitted the FTA package to their respective legislative bodies for adoption. 127 In a public statement, after signing the FTA, the President included improved "security through additional access to Canadian energy supplies" as among the benefits of
the FTA. 128 The House of Representatives initially approved the FTA
legislation on a 366 to 40 vote before its August recess. 129 Final adop-

tion was achieved when the measure passed the United States Senate
on September 19, 1988, on an 83 to 9 vote.12 0 The Canadian Parliament
adopted implementing legislation on December 30, 1988.131 After adoption by both governments, the FTA became effective on January 1,
1989.132

3. FTA's Energy Provisions
Free and open energy trade is a significant component of the FTA
because it serves as a framework to enhance the energy security and
increase the industrial competitiveness of both countries. 3 ' The main
goal for bilateral trade in "energy goods" was nondiscriminatory access
for the United States to Canadian energy supplies and secure market
access for Canadian energy exports to the United States.2 4 One negotiator in the Energy Review Group sees the FTA as creating "a more
stable environment in which market forces can work."' 5 Both sides
have agreed to prohibit restrictions on imports or exports, including
quantitative restrictions, taxes, minimum import or export price
requirements, or any other equivalent measure, subject to very limited
exceptions. 13
'6
More specifically, the FTA prohibits either country from imposing
trade restrictions on energy export commodities (coal, electricity, crude
oil and natural gas) except for limited circumstances involving national
security or health and welfare reasons. 13 7 Even under such conditions,

restrictions can be imposed only if:
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Statement by the President, Office of the Press Secretary (Jan. 2, 1988).
129. 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), 1118 (Aug. 10, 1988).
130. 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), 1264 (Sept. 21, 1988).
131. NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, REGULATORY AGENDA at 9 (March 1, 1989).
132. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988).
133. Interview with R.A Reinstein, supra note 102.

134. Id.
135. Interview with T. D. McGee, Counselor (Energy) Canadian Embassy, Washing-

ton, D.C., Free Trade and Energy Price, Toronto, Ontario (Oct. 22, 1987).
136. Free-Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, United States-Canada, ch. 9, reprinted
in COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

H.R. Doc. No. 100-216,

100th Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1988).
137. Id.
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1. The restrictions do not reduce the proportion of total exports of
that commodity relative to the exporting country's supply of that commodity as measured by the previous three years or other representative period;
2. the exporting country does not impose a higher export price,
including duties, fees, licenses, border prices, etc.; and
3. the restriction does not disrupt the normal channels of supply
or normal proportions among specific commodities. 3 "
The United States and Canada have also agreed to consult on energy
regulatory actions that would directly result in discrimination inconsistent with the principles of the FTA. 13 9 This provision of the FTA is
particularly important to the Canadians. The entire discussion on
natural gas in the Canadian government's briefing paper on the energy
provisions of the FTA states:
The right of consultation, if the United States takes regulatory
action which discriminates against Canadian suppliers, may
do not unfairly
be helpful in assuming that FERC decisions
1 40
penalize natural gas imports from Canada.
Canada's current Minister of Energy, Mines, and Natural Resources,
the Honorable Marcel Masse, characterized the perception of prior
bilateral trade relations as reflecting "the belief that a trade-off existed
between promoting economic growth through exports and enhanced
Canadian security of supply."'' For the Canadians the FTA was
intended as a formal recognition that the dichotomy between trade and
energy reserves has been eliminated, and that economic growth and
1 4
energy security can be pursued as complementary policy objectives. 1
Market-oriented policies function more effectively in an atmosphere
of institutional stability and the FTA serves as a framework for predictability of governmental response.14
The Canadians do not view the FTA as creating a continental energy
policy. No matter how market-oriented the FTA is, the Canadians maintain they have reserved their prerogative to impose restrictions should
such measures be necessary to achieve their national energy policy
out that market access does not equate to
goals.1 4 4 Masse also points
1 45
an obligation to deliver.
138. Id., art. 904.
139. Id., art. 905.
140. THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND ENERGY, supra note 100 at 2.
141. Honorable Marcel Masse, Minister of Energy, Mines and Natural Resources,
Third Annual Joint Conference Canada/U.S. Trade in Energy, Quebec, A.B.A. & C.B.A.
(1988).
142. Id.

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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Moreover, to the Canadians, the energy provisions of the FTA are
generally seen as formalizing a deregulated trading atmosphere that
had developed by 1984 through regulatory and policy changes on both
sides of the border.' 46 Due to excess deliverability (oversupply) and the
drop in crude oil prices, the Canadians do not expect the FTA to expand
natural gas exports.'4 7 Rather, the FTA is viewed as helping to ensure
that gas imports from Canada are not unfairly treated by United States
regulatory bodies.
Despite a major role in several regional U.S. markets, Canadians
insist they do not intend to become a dependent source of supply by
reducing their prices through FTA procedures. 4 ' With respect to existing measures, Canada has agreed to eliminate several practices that
discriminate against energy exports to the United States. Correspondingly, the United States has agreed to eliminate various import restrictions and to allow Canada access to oil from Alaska's North Slope,
subject to certain conditions. 49 The formalization of business-as-usual
natural gas trade comes into clearest perspective in reviewing the FTA's
implementing legislation. FTA energy provisions addressing changes
in existing legislation and regulation are completely silent in the area
of natural gas. 50 As discussed in the following section, the lack of specific
legislative direction has resulted in various proceedings seeking judicial interpretation.
VII.

LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD

The process of deregulating natural gas on both sides of the United
States-Canada border still has not produced the "level playing field"
that has been the oft stated objective of regulators and industry.' 5 '
Nevertheless, the independent actions discussed in earlier chapters
occurring simultaneously have served to bring sharply into focus those
issues looming on the regulatory landscape that pose obstacles to a more
efficient cross-national market in natural gas trade.
Also, the acceptance of the FTA encourages more ambitious
proposals, such as those advanced by Commissioner Phillip O'Connor
of the Illinois Commerce Commission, for a North American energy
consortium or common market.'52 As institutional barriers are removed,
market functions will result in the price of Canadian natural gas to
THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND ENERGY, supra note 100 at 3.
147. Id. at 2.
148. Id.
149. Free-Trade Agreement, supra note 136, ch. 9.
150. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988,
supra note 132 at § 305. Specific changes in the Energy section of the FTA implementation act addressed Alaskan oil to be used in refineries in Vancouver, B.C. and the
use of Canadian produced uranium in the U.S. nuclear program. Id.
151. U.S.-CANADA GAS TRADE REVIEW, supra note 1 at 33. A "level playing field"
means similar regulatory treatment of participants similarly situated in the natural
gas market. Id.
152. P. O'Connor, Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission, as cited in INSIDE
FERC (Feb. 11, 1985).

146.
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end users on both sides of the border ultimately determining both the
levels of gas exports to the United States and domestic prices and
production rates.
A. Agenda for the Future
The major regulatory issues that continue to have an impact upon,
if not distort, Canadian exports to the United States include the following:
1. FERC Opinion No. 256, restricting "as billed" charges;
2. FERC Order No. 380, which tends to restrict the recovery of construction costs for pipeline systems oriented for export;
3. transportation system access under FERC Order No. 500 as it
supercedes Order No. 436;
4. FERC determinations on rate design; and
5. demands by domestic natural gas producers that the FTA be used
to redress disparities between United States and Canadian suppliers.
It is interesting that most of these major issues are products of action
by the FERC. Although the FERC has little direct control over authorized imports, once Canadian natural gas enters the United States, it
is subject to the same market controls that govern domestic production.1 53
1. Opinion No. 256
As mentioned in Part II, the ERA has primary responsibility for
reviewing and authorizing all import arrangements. The FERC has
responsibility for reviewing the construction and operation of facilities, and the terms and conditions applicable to any subsequent sales
for resale and/or transportation of the imported gas in the United States.
The Delegation Orders require the FERC to act in a manner consistent with determinations made by the ERA and the policy considerations reflected in any authorization. These roles often overlap, and inconsistencies occur with some frequency.
One example involves FERC Opinion No. 256.14 In this December
1986 proceeding, the FERC addressed the so-called "as billed" issue.
The central question was whether U.S. interstate pipelines should be
allowed to automatically recover demand charges associated with purchases of Canadian imports through their tariffs.155 While this appears
to be strictly a sale for resale rate question, within the exclusive purview of the FERC, the decision created friction with the ERA's import
policy.
153. U.S.-CANADA GAS TRADE REVIEW, supra note 1 at 43-44.
154. Natural Gas Pipeline of Am., 37 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,215

(Dec. 8, 1986), reh'g denied 39 F.E.R.C. 61,218 (May 27, 1987) (The pipeline had recently
renegotiated a two-part tariff in its Canadian purchase contract and had filed to reflect
demand and commodity charges on an "as-billed" basis in its rates).
155. Id. at 61,543.
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Under FERC Opinions Nos. 256 and 256-A, pipelines that purchase
gas from other pipelines are allowed to pass through the charges in
the form imposed by the seller. 156 In other words, the seller's commodity
and demand charges can be recovered automatically through corresponding charges in the purchaser's resale rates. If the upstream supplier is a producer, however, the regulations require recovery of all
charges through the commodity component of the purchaser's resale
rates. 5 7 Opinion No. 256 involved two kinds of sales: (1) A direct sale
from a Canadian producer to Natural Gas Pipeline Company of American; and (2) a sale by TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. to Great Lakes Gas
Transmission Company for resale to Natural." 8 Natural asked the
FERC for authorization to flow the costs associated with both sales
through to its resale customers on an as-billed basis."'
The FERC initially determined that it had the requisite jurisdiction to address the as-billed issue, even though the ERA had already
approved the contracts that contained the two-part rates at issue. 60
In its approval, ERA stated in pertinent part, that it "endorses in principle the pass through of the two-part structure of the arrangement,
but not necessarily the pass through of every single cost element exactly
as proposed."'' Normally, one would assume that FERC's as-billed regulations cannot apply to Natural's purchases from Canadian suppliers
because the FERC does not examine the rates of Canadian pipelines
and producers. Nevertheless, FERC's "as-billed" regulations were
applied to Natural's purchases from Canadian suppliers even though
FERC does not directly examine the rates of Canadian pipelines and
producers. As a way of ensuring that Canadian contract prices satisfy
the "just and reasonable" standards of the Natural Gas Act of 1938
(NGA), FERC required Natural to modify its demand charge to exclude
Canadian production, gathering and take-or-pay costs as well as all
fixed costs associated with return on equity and related taxes from its
demand charge.' To ensure its decision would not conflict with the
ERA's policy that domestic and imported gas should be treated equally,
the FERC also examined the reasonableness of the demand charges.
Shortly after the issuance of Opinion No. 256, FERC attempted to clarify
the scope of its jurisdiction not to intrude into those areas under ERA's
oversight involving international trade, foreign policy, national secu156. Id. Producer rate changes shall be applied to the commodity component of the
existing rates of a pipeline's two-part rates and to the volumetric rates of a pipeline
company's one-part rates. Pipeline supplier rate charges shall be applied "as-billed"
to a pipeline company's two-part rates and shall be applied to a pipeline company's
volumetric rates in a manner which maintains the pipeline company's existing onepart rate design. 18 C.F.R. § 154.38(d) (1988).
157. Natural Gas Pipeline of Am., 37 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. at 61,544-46.
158. Id. at 61,537.

159. Id.
160. Id. at 61,536.

161. Id.
162. Id. at 61,545-46. FERC specifically rejected its staff s recommendation that
all Canadian gas costs be flowed through as volumetric costs. Id. at 61,544.
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rity and balance of trade payments. 16 3 Opinion No. 256 effectively means
that the typically higher commodity charge under long-term import
contracts must now be recovered through higher sales volumes and that
incremental sales of natural gas will not be able to be as attractively
priced as would have been the case with an "as billed" pass through.
The loss of this pricing incentive deeply concerned the Canadian government and its producers. 16 4 Retaliatory "dumping" of low cost Canadian
gas was threatened.'6 5
If Opinion No. 256 is not modified in later FERC rulings, it will
likely trigger a round of contract renegotiations or litigation between
Canadian producers and their U.S. pipeline customers. Renegotiations
may be voluntary or may be required under contract provisions concerning the effects of certain regulatory actions. The parties probably
will strive to shift costs from demand components and thereby raise
commodity components of two-part price structures. Since any increase
in commodity charges will lessen a pipeline's propensity to purchase
incremental volumes, take-or-pay and related provisions may also
require amendments. Finally, contracts with "regulatory out" clauses
may be subject to termination, depending upon the specific language
of the particular provision.
2. Order No. 380
FERC's rate policies must be considered as a crucial factor by Canadian pipelines and producers when entering into an export sales contract with U.S. interstate pipeline companies. Under FERC Order No.
380, pipelines are not allowed to charge customers for the cost of gas
that the customer refuses to take, thereby depriving the pipeline of
its equivalent of take-or-pay protection.'6 6 This in turn forces pipelines
to minimize their own exposure to take-or-pay, whether the pipeline
is contracting for domestic or imported gas supplies.
As discussed in Part III, some pipelines that purchase Canadian
supplies under long-term contracts have renegotiated their contracts
to include two-part price structures. These structures are composed of
a demand and a commodity charge, and have been subject to a number of criticisms before the FERC. These criticisms are examined in
more detail later in this chapter.
Another FERC rate policy affecting imports has evolved from a rate
case involving Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation.'6 7 In that case,
163. Northern Border Pipeline Co., 39 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
61,104 at 61,355 (April 30, 1987) reh'gdenied, 41 F.E.R.C. (CCH) 61,275 (Dec. 4, 1987).
164. U.S. CANADA GAS TRADE REVIEW, supra note 1 at 1. The strong response of
the Canadian government was demonstrated by an exchange of letters between Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulrooney and President Ronald Reagan. Id.
165. Interview with Andrea K. Waldman, supra note 105.
166. 18 C.F.R. § 154.111 (1989). Order 380 was issued on May 25, 1984 and required
the elimination of minimum commodity bills from interstate pipeline tariffs. As a result,
pipelines could no longer charge their local distribution company customers for con-

tract levels which were not actually taken. Id.
167. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 831
F.2d 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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the FERC adopted new standards to determine if a particular pipeline
has been "imprudent" or "abusive" in its gas purchasing practices.
If either is found, the pipeline can be penalized in a number of ways,
including denying the pass through of full gas purchase costs to customers. The FERC had permitted pipeline companies to directly bill
their customers for deferred production-related costs because this
approach "will equitably bill customers for the higher amounts they
should have paid based on actual purchases during past billing
periods."1 68 The D.C. Court of Appeals ruled that the direct billing
approach was in effect retroactive rate making and beyond the FERC's
scope of authority." 9
The Order No. 380 series of rulings prohibited the so-called "minimum bill" in which domestic and imported gas contracts stated takeor-pay levels in terms of volume-related minimum obligations. Correspondingly, when considered against the NEB's desire to ensure that
volumes committed to export were actually taken, a potential conflict
was created by import contracts with high take-or-pay provisions.
In an attempt to avoid running afoul of Order No. 380, one importer
adopted a "settlement payment" tier for a specified amount per MMBTU
for volumes below a set take-or-pay level but above the minimum or
actual annual volume.Y0 This approach has been accepted by the
FERC.' 7 After lobbying by Canadian industry and government representatives, FERC issued an amendment to its order, which exempted
the pre-built sections of Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System
(ANGTS) in southern Canada from Order No. 380."' The overall value
of this ruling is dubious because it involves the ANGTS, which was
specifically excepted from Order No. 380 by Order No. 380-A.
Furthermore, the D.C. Court of Appeals has ruled that even though
the provisions of Order No. 380 may burden an export agreement
approved by ERA, it does not exceed FERC's jurisdiction to apply the
minimum bill requirements to such agreements. 7 3 The issue before the
Court of Appeals in that case was based on the claim that Order No.
380 was contrary to ERA approval of take-or-pay provisions in an export
168. Id. at 1140 (quoting Brief for Commission at 13 (quoting Transcontinental Gas
Pipeline Corp., 33 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,213 at 61,443 (1985))).
169. Columbia Gas, 831 F.2d at 1137.
170. Elimination of Variable Costs from Certain Natural Gas Pipeline Minimum
Commodity Bill Provisions, 27 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,318 (May
25, 1984), reh'g denied, 28 F.E.R.C. (CCH) 61,175 (July 30, 1984), reh'g denied, 29
F.E.R.C. (CCH) 61,077 (Oct. 24, 1984), affd sub nom. Wisconsin Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 770 F.2d 1144 (D.C.Cir. 1985), cert. denied Trunkline Gas Co. v.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 476 U.S. 1114 (1986).
171. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 23 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 63,079,
affd 27 F.E.R.C. (CCH) 61,012 (1984).
172. Elimination of Variable Costs from Certain Natural Gas Pipeline Minimum
Comodity Bill Provisions, Order Denying Rehearing and Granting in Part Applications
for Stay, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,259 (1984).
173. Wisconsin Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 770 F.2d 1144 (D.C.Cir.
1985), cert. denied Trunkline Gas. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Com'n, 476 U.S. 1114
(1986).
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agreement. The Court ruled that even though the pipeline's minimum
bill was eliminated from its tariff, the Order did not alter the conditions of the underlying
contract and that any impact on ERA jurisdic174
tion was "trivial.'
FERC subsequently faced the question of restricting cost recovery
provisions agreed to in Canadian export agreements under Order No.
380 in tariff filings by Natural Gas Pipeline of America. 175 Despite prior
approval of the contract's allocation of Canadian pipeline charges to
the United States pipeline as demand charges by both the ERA and
FERC's administrative law judge, the Commission removed some
charges from the demand component of the tariff and required that they
be reflected as commodity charges. In its decision, FERC noted that:
The essence of the as-billed principle is that the 'upstream pipeline's demand charges are included in the downstream pipeline's
demand charges and the upstream pipeline's commodity charges
are included in the downstream pipeline's commodity
charges." 7 6
Although FERC seems willing enough to engage in restructuring rates
of ERA approved contracts, it has more recently stated that it will not
intrude in areas involving international trade and foreign policy over
which ERA has jurisdiction.'7 7
Recently, one major interstate pipeline has sought judicial relief
from its long-term import contract due, in part, to the effects of Order
No. 380. In its complaint for declaratory relief based upon the contract
doctrines of force majeure, impossibility of performance and commercial frustration, Northwest Pipeline alleged that:
The issuance and implementation of Orders Nos. 380, 436 and
500 and certain related regulatory directives has deprived
Northwest of its historical merchant function by regulatory fiat
and relegated it to the role of a transporter for gas sold by others
and a supplier only of last resort.'7 8
While this case has been settled, it is a clear example of how FERC
policies that are primarily directed at domestic natural gas sales impact
upon import arrangements that have previously been approved by the
NEB and the ERA.
174. Wisconsin Gas, 770 F.2d at 1156.
175. Natural Gas Pipeline of America, 37 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
61,215 (Dec. 8, 1986), reh'g denied, 39 F.E.R.C. (CCH) 61,218 (May 27, 1987).
176. Id. at 61,861.
177. Northern Border Pipeline Co., 39 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) at
61,355.
178. Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Westcoast Energy, Inc., C88-1262 (filed Oct. 3,
1988, U.S.D.C. W.D. Washington). This case was settled on a basis of payment of
$10,413,718.56 by the pipeline to its Canadian supplier. As a result of NEB approval
of this settlement, Northwest was released from its service agreement and Westcoast
has become a "Canadian open access" pipeline transporting natural gas on behalf of
the British Columbia Producers Cooperative (BCPC) to Kingsgate for delivery into
Northwest's system for transportation as spot-market natural gas.
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3. Order No. 500
The premier issue for the natural gas industry has been FERC's
effort to open up access to interstate natural gas pipelines for the transportation on behalf of other parties of gas not owned by the pipeline
company. Open access transportation is of concern to imported natural
gas as well.
Open access transportation was originally adopted as part of FERC
Order No. 436. However, in Maryland People's Counsel v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, the circuit court remanded the proposal
to FERC for further consideration.'79 It was reissued on August 14, 1987,
as Order No. 500.80 Open access is of particular concern for imported
natural gas because under the Original Order No. 436 none of the
United States pipeline companies that interconnected at the U.S.Canada border had applied for a 436 certificate, One month after Order
No. 500 was issued by FERC, the D.C. Circuit Court entered an order
making it effective immediately. 8 ' As modified by Order No. 500,
nineteen of forty interstate pipelines capable of open access transportation for imported natural gas have accepted such blanket certificates."8 2
As discussed in Part II, the major long-run limitation on natural
gas imports is the transportation capacity of United States pipelines.
Voluntary open access to this already limited transportation network
is vital. Fortunately, a number of pipelines that would be used for transporting direct purchases of Canadian gas either have accepted Order
No. 500 certificates or already have appropriate transportation rates
under Section 311 of the NGPA in place, thus eliminating a major source
of potential controversy in contested case proceedings before the FERC
under Section 7 of the NGA. s3
4. Rate Design
The Canadian approach to market-responsive pricing has chiefly
employed a straight fixed-variable pricing structure where gas supplies
with a different rate structure were offered to United States customers.
This rate structure includes a two-part division of fixed and variable
demand and commodity costs approved by the NEB for use in Canada.
This type of rate structure has not been approved for use in the United
States for several decades.
179. 761 F.2d 780 (D.C.Cir. 1985).
180. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Interim
Rule and Statement of Policy, 52 Fed Reg. 30,334 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n
1987).
181. Associated Gas Distributors v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 824 F.2d 981
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, Interstate Natural Gas Assoc. of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 108 S.Ct. 1468 (1988).

182.

CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, NATURAL GAS TRENDS,

1988-89

EDI-

82 (1988).
183. U.S.-CANADA GAS TRADE REVIEW, supra note 1 at 37-39.

TION
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Under the straight fixed-variable two-part rate, pipeline costs
deemed to be fixed are allocated among the various classes of customers
and assigned to the demand charge that the customer pays regardless
of the volume of purchases. All other costs become variable costs,
and recovered as a volumetric charge
assigned to a commodity charge,
4
per unit of gas purchased.1
As a general proposition, natural gas can more easily compete with
fuel oil if the commodity charge is relatively low. However, the approach
that FERC has pursued has proven to be at cross purposes with this
approach because since the 1950s, it has favored assigning a portion
of fixed costs to the commodity charge. This approach encouraged pipeline efficiency in investment and operations by shifting some of the
risk from the customer to the pipeline company.
As oil prices began to fall, FERC in 1984, modified the fixed-variable
rate structure on an individual basis, by assigning all fixed costs (except
taxes) to the demand charge, return on equity and all producer costs
(about 20 to 25 percent of total fixed costs).' Keeping gas production
charges, including take-or-pay charges in the commodity cost, places
the economic risk on the pipeline shareholders if the system does not
market sufficient volumes to recover all fixed costs. This is an attempt
to allow market forces to have the greatest possible effect within the
existing regulatory framework. However, the burdensome levels of takeor-pay commitments on many pipeline systems overwhelmed this
change in rate design. After it became clear that the resolution of this
issue was a critical factor in pipelines being willing to accept open access
certificates under Order Nos. 436 and 500, FERC permitted the passthrough of 25 to 50 percent of take-or-pay payments as demand
charges. 6
Some form of rate regulation remains unavoidable for transportation, however, in order to deal with the natural monopoly characteristics of interstate pipelines. So-called "postage stamp" transportation
rates that assign one price or rate to natural gas transported over any
distance have been a sensitive issue with Canadian and United States
producers. Both factions have argued that such rates are discriminatory to gas that travels only a short distance to its ultimate market.'8 7
The alternative approach is to use mileage based rates as FERC originally proposed in Order No. 436.188 So far, the low incidental cost of
moving natural gas in combination with the complex nature of FERC
reporting and cost accounting has not provided the necessary incen-

184. A REVIEW OF THE ROLE

AND OPERATIONS OF INTERPROVINCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL

PIPELINES IN CANADA ENGAGED IN THE BUYING, SELLING AND TRANSMISSION OF NATURAL

GAS, supra note 2 at 78-79.

185. Natural Gas Pipe Line Company, 25 Fed. Energy Reg. Comrn'n Rep. (CCH)
61,478 (Nov. 4, 1983).
186. 18 C.F.R. §§ 2, 284 (1989).
187. U.S.-CANADA GAS TRADE REVIEW, supra note 1 at 38.
188. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Final
Rule and Statement of Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408, 42,410 (1985).
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tive to move away from postage stamp rates. The Canadian government claimed that such charges were biased against "northern tier suppliers" after FERC approved postage stamp transportation rates on systems operated by Natural Gas Pipe Line Company of America and
Northern Natural Gas Company.'8 9 Yet another variation has been the
use of area or zone rates for assessing transportation charges. This
approach has met with skepticism because the zones can be arbitrarily drawn in apparent attempts to protect key pipeline market areas. 190
On May 30, 1989, the FERC issued a policy statement which showed
that the commission is prepared to apply a new standard of economic
efficiency to pipeline transportation rates in order to determine whether
such charges would be just and reasonable.' 9' Enforcement of the policy
will be left to the participants in the rate case and the administrative
law judges presiding over them.'92 The FERC requires the resolution
of six major issues for those pipelines which had been operating as open
access systems.'
In particular this statement reflects a movement away from the
modified-fixed-variable rates and will result in the elimination of the
demand charge for recovering fixed costs based on annual usage of pipeline capacity. The statement was issued principally in response to
demands by gas producers and other non-local distribution companies
who have been shipping on interstate pipelines. The rate design policy
has been referred to as a measure for the enforcement of Order No.
436 and Order No. 500.1' It is interesting to note that the D.C. Circuit
Court expressly left open for "another day and another proceeding"
the issue of how economic efficiency will be determined. 9 '
B. Producer Complaints
U.S. producers have been concerned that a flood of Canadian gas
will come across the border and undercut opportunity for market growth
from them.'96 The initial perception of this threat appears to have begun
189. Telephone interview with Constance L. Buckley, Director, Natural Gas Division, Office of Fuels Programs, Office of Fossil Energy (March 11, 1989).
190. Id.
191. Policy Statement Providing Guidance with Respect to the Designing of Rates,
54 Fed. Reg. 24,382 (1989).

192. Id. at 24,382.
193. Id. at 24,384-87. The issues to be evaluated in the rate case include:

(1) Annual versus Seasonal Rates.
(2) Demand and Commodity Charges.
(3) Capacity Adjustments.
(4) Discounting and Maximum Interruptible Rates.
(5) Transportation Rates.
(6) Separation of Transportation, Storage and Gathering Services. Id
194. Moring, PipelineRate - Design, Policy Involves Problems for LDC's,6 NAT. GAS
11 (August 1989).
195. Associated Gas Distributors v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 824 F.2d 981
at 1012 (D.C.Cir. 1987).
196. U.S. Gas ProducersFearMarket Losses to Canada with Trade Pact,OIL & GAS
J. 17 (April 4, 1988).
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with the Western Accord. 197 The Western Accord foreshadowed policy
changes that resulted in a growing availability of natural gas in Canada.
Consequently, a growing Canadian surplus might allow Canada to drop
its "least cost alternative" test for competing fuels criteria in order
to move additional volumes, which would place even greater pressure
under the FTA, Canada is obligated to
on U.S. gas prices. Indeed,
198
eliminate these criteria.
It is not surprising that natural gas importation was the focus of
the substantial controversy in negotiating the energy provisions in the
FTA. 199 For instance, the twenty-nine states that are signatories to the
Interstate Oil Compact Commission presented a resolution opposing
the approval and implementation of the FTA because of "current U.S.
and Canadian regulatory practices, which give Canadian natural gas
preferential treatment in U.S. markets."2 0 United States producers
have made several specific arguments to support their claims, which
are examined in the next sections of this chapter.
1. Two-Part Border Price Distortion
Pipeline sales of natural gas to an end user or local distribution
2 01
companies (LDC) are priced according to a two-part rate. ' The demand
component is based on the size of the service obligation under the contract. The commodity rate is based upon the actual deliveries of natural
gas to the purchaser. Such two-tiered pricing is used because end users
02
or LDCs can readily shift between alternative suppliers. As a general
rule, pipelines are under pressure to keep their commodity rates low,
0
but they do not face the same pressure regarding demand charges.
Canadian natural gas suppliers may have achieved an advantage
in the United States market because they have settled high pre-existing
take-and-pay obligations for a favorable division between demand and
commodity components, which shifts commodity costs into their demand
charges." 4 United States producers claim that this allows Canadian
gas (which is assumed to be more expensive on a total unit costs basis)
to compete favorably with domestic gas when costs are required by
20 5
As discussed
FERC rules to be recovered in pipeline commodity rates
earlier in this chapter, FERC's "as billed" decision, Opinion No. 256,
limited demand charge treatment of Canadian gas to those costs that
197. LeMay, White Paperon Canada Gas Dumping (CanadianGas Issue) and Pipe
Shortagesfor Drilling Wells, NEW MEXICO DEPT. OF ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
OI

CONSERVATION DIVIsION (Oct. 3, 1987).
198. See, Free-Trade Agreement, supra note 136, ch. 9, annex 905.2.
199. Interview with R.A. Reinstein, supra note 102.
200. INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, RESOLUTION ON U.S.-CANADA FREE

AGREEMENT

TRADE

(undated).

201.

U.S.-CANADA

GAS TRADE REVIEW, supra note 1 at 40.

204.

BACKGROUND

PAPER:

202. Id.
203. Id.

U.S.-CANADIAN

NATURAL

GAS

TRADE,

INDEPENDENT

PETROLEUM Ass'N. OF AMERICA, 1 (Dec. 7, 1987).

205. Id.
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would be allowed demand charge treatment by downstream domestic
pipelines. The application of this rule is said not to have a uniform
impact in all regional natural gas markets."0 6 This is because the ERA
has not applied FERC Order No. 256 principles to the border prices
it regulates. For example, in the case of California and Minnesota, Canadian natural gas imports are regulated by the ERA. Because the gas
is not delivered to distribution companies there are no subsequent "first
sales" which are subject to FERC rate regulation." 7 United States
producers selling into these markets may be at some disadvantage.
Domestic producers requested United States negotiators to incorporate
a commitment to implement Opinion No. 256 principles at the ERA
in the FTA's implementation plan.2"'
2. Discount and Market Share Contracts
TransCanada Pipeline holds a long term supply contract with
Minegasco, an LDC in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area.20 9 The selling
price is based upon a 7 percent discount from the interstate pipeline's
sales tariffs.210 This arrangement is claimed to prevent domestic suppliers from effectively competing with Canadian prices, regardless of
how far Northern "markets-out," i.e., reduces prices to market clearing levels under the provision of its gas purchase contract with its
domestic producers.2 1' United States producers have unsuccessfully
challenged this arrangement before the ERA.212 ERA found that the
contract was competitive and that rate issues not addressed in the contract 13
were subject to review before the State Public Utility Commission.

2

A related concern arises in the Northwest Pipeline-Westcoast Transmission agreement. A specific volume or market share commitment
is made to the Canadian supplier, regardless of the price of domestic
supplies. 214 In the case of Northwest Pipeline, 42.5 percent of the pipeline systems sales and 75 percent of incremental volumes were to be
supplied by Westcoast Transmission. 215 According to U.S. producers,

both formula rates and guaranteed market share contracts tend to insulate Canadian natural gas from market forces and distort competition
in the United States market." 6 Domestic producers view such provi206. CanadianImports Trouble IPAMS, WESTERN
207. Lemay, supra note 197 at 5.

OIL WORLD (July,

1988) at 12.

208. BACKGROUND PAPER: U.S.-CANADIAN NATURAL GAS TRADE, supra note 204.

209. Id.
210. Minnegasco, Inc., Energy Mgmt. (CCH), 1 ERA 70,721 at 72,723 (Sept. 1,
1987), reh'g denied, 70,738 (Nov. 20, 1987).
211. BACKGROUND PAPER: U.S.-CANADIAN GAS TRADE, supra note 204 at 3.
212. Minnegasco, Inc., Energy Mgmt. (CCH), 1 ERA 70,721 (Sept. 1, 1987), reh'g
denied, 70,738.
213. Id. at 72,731-32.
214. BACKGROUND PAPER: U.S.-CANADiAN NATURAL GAS TRADE, supra note 204 at 3.
215. A REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND OPERATIONS OF INTERPROVINCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PIPELINES IN CANADA ENGAGED IN THE BUYING, SELLING AND TRANSMISSION OF NATURAL
GAS, supra note 2 at 71.
216. BACKGROUND PAPER: U.S.-CANADIAN NATURAL GAS TRADE, supra note 204.
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sions in contracts for imported natural gas as contrary to the intent
of the FTA and asked that they be declared contrary to public policy." 7
At the same time, it must be considered that gas-to-gas competition
from spot market sales, regardless of the source, can easily weaken such
market-share arrangements.""
3. ANGTS Exemptions
In order to obtain private financing of the Alaskan Natural Gas
Transportation System (ANGTS) pipeline, Congress accepted a proposal
from the Carter Administration for a so-called "waiver package" that
suspended application of various portions of the Natural Gas Act.2" 9
As a result, the FERC's ability to review and remedy claims of discriminatory rate practices on the pre-built pipelines is limited. United
States producers claimed ANGTS tariffs resulted in domestic producers
and gas consumers subsidizing the underutilization of the Northern
Border (East Leg) and Pacific Interstate Transmission (West Leg) pipelines.220 Because the ANGTS project had not been completed, United
a repeal of the ANGTS waiver package with
States producers sought 22
the passage of the FTA. '
Alternatively, as a part of the administrative plan, it was recommended that the FERC treat transportation rate discounts on pre-built
pipelines as a "below the line" shareholder expense rather than a cost
that can be recovered through cost-of-service tariffs from other cusother
and
tomers.2 22 So far, FERC has declined to apply Order No. 380 22
3
provisions for stimulating market competition to ANGTS.
4. Market-Responsive Contracts
Generally, long-term gas supply contracts were written during a
period of shortage. Consequently, the parties to such agreements saw
stability of supply and volume of purchases as taking priority and did
not include the flexibility to be totally market responsive. Interstate
pipelines and domestic producers have attempted to respond to market changes by renegotiating contracts in order to gain market access
through transportation service. United States producers charge that
in Order No. 500, FERC provided for de facto contract abrogation
through the requirement of take-or-pay crediting as a precondition for
transportation. 4 The question of transportation credits is discussed
in FERC's rulemaking under Order No. 500 and was recast to respond
to the concerns expressed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in
217. Id.
218. Interview with John Smith, Manager, Joint Ventures, Northwest Pipeline Corporation, in Salt Lake City, Utah (March 5, 1989).
219. 15 U.S.C. §§ 719-719o (1988).
220. BACKGROUND PAPER: U.S.-CANADIAN NATURAL GAS TRADE, supranote 204 at 4.

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See Order Denying Rehearing and Granting in Part Applications for Stay, supra
note 172.
224. BACKGROUND PAPER: U.S.-CANADIAN NATURAL GAS TRADE, supra note 204 at 4.
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Associated Gas Distributorsv. FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission.2 25
In that case, the Court of Appeals saw an unacceptable loss in the bargaining power of pipelines with producers, without giving pipelines veto
power over transportation as a means to mitigate gas supply contract
take-or-pay liability.226 As discussed earlier, FERC has not imposed comparable requirements upon imported natural gas contracts, even though
many long-term Canadian contracts contain either take-or-pay or takeand-pay clauses similar to those found in domestic gas contracts.
United States producers want a commitment from the federal
government to subject Canadian natural gas to the same marketresponsive standards applicable to domestic production. A recommended
solution has been to give the Secretary of Energy direction to issue a
new delegation order giving the FERC exclusive jurisdiction over purchasing practices of interstate pipelines, even when the mix of imported
gas is at issue.22 7
5. Exploration Subsidies and Incentives
United States producers contend that the Canadian government
is providing incentives to encourage new exploration for oil and gas
reserves. 22 8 The argument is made that absent similar incentives in
the United States, Canadian policies create a bias favoring Canadian
reserves in a climate of over-deliverability. 9 However, under the
General Agreement on Trade on Tariffs (GATT), to which the United
States is a signatory, such government assistance could become the
basis for a complaint that the United States was violating the "national
treatment" obligation. 3 ' The rationale of GATT generally is that laws
and regulations should not be adopted if their purpose or effect is to
discriminate against foreign and domestic goods on the basis of nationality.22 ' Article 906 of the FTA clearly preserved the right of each country to develop programs to stimulate oil and gas exploration and producto maintain the reserve base for these energy
tion "in order
23 2
resources."
6. Affiliate Transactions
United States marketing affiliates of Canadian pipelines are highly
involved in spot market transactions. For example, the United States
based Western Gas Marketing is affiliated with TransCanada and Great
Lakes; and Alberta and Southern is affiliated with California operated
Pacific Gas Transmission.2 33 Transactions between these affiliated com225. 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987) cert. denied, Interstate Natural Gas Assoc.
Am. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 108 S.Ct. 1468 (1988).
226. Id. at 1021.
227. BACKGROUND PAPER: U.S.-CANADIAN NATURAL GAS TRADE, supra note 204 at
228. LeMay, supra note 197 at 6.
229. BACKGROUND PAPER: U.S.-CANADIAN NATURAL GAS TRADE, supranote 204 at
230. Interview with R.A. Reinstein, supra note 102.
231. Id.
232. See Free-Trade Agreement, supra note 136, art. 906.
233. BACKGROUND PAPER: U.S.-CANADAN NATURAL GAS TRADE, supranote 204 at
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367

panies arguably are beyond the jurisdiction of the FERC because they
are not jurisdictional "sales."2 4 Domestic producers see the problem
as analogous to market groups that are affiliated with interstate pipelines, in that it will always be to the affiliate's interest to engage in
self-dealing
rather than purchasing or transporting third-party domestic
23 5
gas.

Correspondingly, this group wanted a provision added to implementing legislation clarifying that sales of imported natural gas are not "first
sales" within the meaning of Section 2(21) of the NGPA.2 36 This would
clarify FERC jurisdiction over the marketing affiliate's resales. They
also sought inclusion, as a part of the plan for administrative action,
of a requirement that the ERA will institute a rulemaking of marketing affiliate practices
to parallel the FERC's efforts for interstate pipe2 37
line companies.

7. FTA Consultation
Numerous disputes over routine matters such as accounting questions arise before the FERC and have prompted intervention by Cana23
dian gas interests as well as the attention of the Canadian embassy.
The FTA provides that the parties will consult on energy regulatory
actions which could result directly "in discrimination ...inconsistent
with the principles of ... [the] Agreement."2' 39 Domestic producers

wanted the FTA to provide for an annual consultation conference
between the U.S. Secretary of Energy and the Canadian Minister of
Energy recognizing the independence of the NEB and the FERC.24 °
C. Administrative and Judicial Skirmishing
In reviewing the above proposals it is significant to note the reliance which domestic producers have placed in the FERC rather than
in the ERA. Perhaps some of the reluctance to vigorously pursue
changes in ERA practices can be seen in recent case law. Judicial review
was requested after ERA granted a blanket authorization under Section 3 of the NGA to Northridge Petroleum Marketing, a marketing
affiliate of a Canadian operation, to import natural gas from Canada
for a period of two years at volumes of 100 BCF per year.241 The D.C.

Circuit Court of Appeals upheld ERA reliance on its 1984 Policy Guidelines establishing the presumption of public interest which had to be
234. 15 U.S.C. § 3301(21) (1988) defines "first sales" for the purpose of FERC regulation.
235. BACKGROUND PAPER: U.S.-CANADiAN NATURAL GAS TRADE, supranote 204 at 4.
236. Id.

237. Inquiry into Alleged Anticompetitive Practices Related to Marketing Affiliates of Interstate Pipelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 21,578 (1987).
238. Interview with T. D. McGee, supra note 135.
239. Free-Trade Agreement, supra note 136, art. 905.
240. BACKGROUND PAPER: U.S.-CANADIAN NATURAL GAs TRADE, supra note 204 at 3.
241. Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Assn. v. Economic Regulatory Admin.,

822 F.2d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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rebutted by the protesting party.242 This case is also significant because
a trial-type hearing was ruled unnecessary at the agency level because
the challenge was to issues of policy and not " 'material issues of fact
genuinely in dispute'" as required by ERA rules. 42
The same plaintiff has been equally unsuccessful in the Fifth Circuit.244 The domestic producers had requested that ERA require all
imported natural gas to be transported by open access pipeline. Because
there was no equivalent requirement for domestic production, ERA had
uniformly found that such a condition would unfairly discriminate
against Canadian imports.24 5 The Fifth Circuit held that the 1984 guidelines were properly the result of interagency review by the Department
of Energy, FERC and the State Department. 4 The court stated in this
regard that:
In particular, it is evident to us as it was to the ERA that there
is no greater potential for discrimination in the distribution of
imported gas than currently exists in the distribution of domestic gas. PPROA [the plaintiff, Panhandle Producer and Royalty
Owner's Association] has not shown that affiliate relationships
are more prevalent among transporters of imported gas than
among transporters of domestic gas. We can only conclude, then,
in
that a purchaser of Canadian gas faces no fewer obstacles
247
bringing its gas to market than does a domestic seller.
ERA's conclusion that a special "open-access" requirement for imports
would "discriminate against foreign suppliers of gas and those seeking to import this gas and would lessen competition in the market place"
was sustained.2 4 These kinds of issues will persist until domestic
producers feel that249they are not unfairly losing market share to Canadian competitors.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Changes in U.S. and Canadian regulation have tightened the connection between supply source and market demand. The final adoption of the Free Trade Agreement, which became effective on Jan242. Id. at 1111-13.
243. Id. at 1113 (quoting 10 C.F.R. § 590.313(a) (1986)).
244. Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Assn. v. Economic Regulatory Admin.,

847 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1988).
245. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., Energy Mgmt. (CCH), 1 ERA

70,674 (Nov. 6,

1986); reh'g denied, 70,684 (Jan. 5, 1987); Western Gas Marketing U.S.A., Ltd., Energy
Mgmt. (CCH), 1 ERA 70,675 (Nov. 6, 1986) reh'g denied, 70,684 (Jan. 5, 1987); Enron
Gas Marketing, Inc., Energy Mgmt. (CCH), 1 ERA 70,676 (Nov. 6, 1986) reh'gdenied,
70,684 (Jan. 5, 1987).

246. Panhandle Producers,847 F.2d at 1174.
247. Id. at 1177.
248. Id. (citing Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., Energy Mgmt. (CCH), 1 ERA
at 72,605 (Nov. 6, 1986) reh'g denied,

70,764

70,684 (Jan. 5, 1987)).

249. CanadianImports Trouble IPAMS, supra note 206. David Wilson of IPAMS
contends that federal regulation should require pipelines to impose mileage as opposed
to "postage stamp" rates for transportation services as a means for maintaining local
or regional markets. Id.
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uary 1, 1989, more than institutionalizes the market adjustments in
cross-border natural gas trade which have been occurring since 1984
in response to decontrol initiatives. The consultation provisions of the
FTA should prevent the recurrence of regulatory actions like Opinion
No. 256, which impose unnecessary limitations on market relationships.
Regulatory intervention in the natural gas industry reached it
height in the 1960s. The latest steps toward reduced economic regulation continue a trend started in the 1970s.25 In the need to reform
governmental controls over energy, regulatory bodies such as FERC
and ERA have ventured beyond the laborious Congressional process.
For example, with all the restructuring that has occurred in the natural
gas industry in the last five years, only the repeal of the Fuel Use Act
was achieved by Congressional action. 5 1 Whether this ambitious
administrative approach will have lasting success without clear statutory authority remains questionable.
In Canada the dimensions of decontrol were even broader than the
traditional tension between regulator and industry. The very nature
of the Canadian federal system required that regulatory proposals by
the NEB be preceded by intergovernmental agreements with the three
major natural gas producing provinces. Execution of the Western Accord
on March 25, 1985, and the Agreement on Market and Prices shortly
thereafter clearly fixed market-responsive prices as the goal to be
achieved by unraveling an elaborate set of procedures that previously
controlled natural gas exports. Yet, with a less complicated pipeline
transmission system and smaller market to serve, Canada appears to
have achieved a greater level of deregulation than the United States.
The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) embodied the principle that the economics of the marketplace should govern the level
of trade between the two countries in energy goods. The energy provisions of the FTA assure that neither country will erect regulatory barriers to future incremental growth in natural gas imports from Canada.
Most importantly, if supplies tighten, trade cannot be constrained below
proportionate levels. Additionally, the FTA did not alter current or
future production incentives of either country.
The FTA established a formal consultative mechanism for reviewing "energy regulatory actions" that result in discrimination against
the other nation's energy goods. The possible breach of the FTA by
regulatory action from the FERC's decisions and reprisals by Canada
is a lingering concern. The actions of the FERC and ERA in the United
States and the Canadian NEB are squarely within the scope of any
requested consultation. The harmonization of rate design is a certain
topic for these discussions. 52
250. A

REvIEW OF THE ROLE AND OPERATIONS OF INTERPROVINCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL

PIPELINES IN CANADA ENGAGED IN THE BUYING, SELLING AND TRANSMISSION OF NATURAL

supra note 2 at 74.
251. P.L. 100-42, 101 Stat. 311 (May 21, 1987).
252. Interview with Andrea K. Waldman, supra note 105.
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Imported Canadian natural gas will continue to claim a larger share
of the U.S. market with current levels doubling by 1995 to as much
as 8 to 10 percent. 5 This is particularly true for the New England states
and California where future growth in the use of imported natural gas
is dependent upon new pipeline construction. Nevertheless its significance in the U.S. gas market will continue to be as a competitive
alternate source of supply to domestic natural gas supplies, as well as
a secure source to offset increased reliance on less reliable sources of
imported oil.
Deregulation policies over the last five years in both the United
States and Canada have gone a great way toward making natural gas
more responsive to market conditions. This has allowed natural gas
to recapture markets first lost to oil following price drops in the early
1980s and then again in 1985 and 1986. Whether these customers can
be retained is heavily influenced by rate design.
The Canadian approach to market-responsive pricing has chiefly
employed a straight fixed-variable rate structure. Incremental gas supplies were offered to U.S. customers under a rate structure similar to
that used for Canadian sales. Competition and regulatory efficiency
argue for a rate design favoring interruptible sales where large end
users have the ability to switch to alternate fuels. In order to compete
with fuel oil natural gas must be able to be sold at its average variable
cost. FERC should pursue a rate structure for interruptible sales, i.e.,
spot market, which puts very little fixed cost in the commodity charge.
Although the NGA requires that pipeline rates be "just and reasonable," FERC has discretion in applying this standard. Moreover, the
case law in this area recognizes this administrative flexibility. For example, the United States Supreme Court has given approval to rates calculated on the basis of average production costs.254 This approach may
not be completely certain because total deregulation of a specific class
of otherwise jurisdictional sales has not been judicially sanctioned. One
court of appeals has overruled an earlier effort to completely decontrol prices for certain types of natural gas.25 5
Interruptible sales made through interstate pipelines should be able
to be competitively priced under an approved rate structure as long
as firm customers taking gas under system supply contracts are assured
that interruptible rates will not be so low as make their contribution
to covering fixed costs negative.
FERC has been sensitive to its lack of statutory authority to order
pipelines to offer mandatory transportation in the manner of other regulated common carriers.2 5 Congress specifically rejected a similar
proposal for imposing common carrier status on natural gas pipelines
253. U.S.-CANADA GAS TRADE REVIEW, supra note 1 at 42.
254. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 611 (1944).
255. City of Detroit v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 230 F.2d 810 (D.C.Cir. 1955).
256. See generally 49 U.S.C. §§ 101-11917 (1982).
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in the Natural Gas Act of 1938.257 In the face of such limitations, in
Order No. 500 FERC has gone so far as to authorize interstate pipe-

lines to condition open access transportation on submittal of irrevocable offers of take-or-pay credits from producers." 8 This tactic can only
be as successful as the expansion of spot market sales and the success
of transportation in implementing these transactions. Looking at the
substantial volume of short-term sales in 1987, and the number of major
interstate pipelines which have accepted Order No. 500 certificates,
it would seem to be an effective tool. As of October 31, 1988, there were
nineteen
open access systems and sixteen pipelines that were not
"open." 255 Open access carriage is a consequence of the market control
interstate pipelines had held on commodity trading as well as the
natural monopoly over transportation service.
After years of debate, Congress enacted the Natural Gas Policy Act
in 1978 to modify the regulatory system to permit wellhead markets
to begin to set prices, but initially only for certain high-cost vintages.
The bulk of new discoveries was not slated for deregulation until January 1, 1985. The second oil crisis began shortly after the NGPA was
signed, dramatically raising oil prices and dashing any hope of gradual
convergence between oil and gas prices during the 1978-1985 deregulation period. The NGPA represented a final policy judgement that the
commodity market for natural gas was not subject to monopoly forces
that required full regulatory control.
No program of direct transportation for users or producers was
included in NGPA. Rather, a program of incremental pricing of natural
gas was enacted that threatened to price natural gas to large end users
at its fuel oil equivalent before allowing smaller consumer's prices to
rise. Unfortunately, this program confirmed the strategies of many
industrial users to pursue energy conservation and to switch away from

natural gas.
Over 35 percent of the U.S. natural gas market has the capacity
to convert to alternate fuels with relatively short lead times and pricing incentives.8 Because of this user flexibility, most of the decontrol
efforts have been focused on the spot market. The ERA's blanket
authorization procedures and the NEB's after-the-fact approvals for
short-term export arrangements are examples of this emphasis. It is
all too evident that the adjustments are not complete when one compares the fact that over 60 percent of the natural gas sold in the United
States in 1987 moved in the spot market whereas less than half that
percentage of imported Canadian natural gas was accounted for in shortterm sales. Regulatory practices that try to preserve the distinction
257. Reiter, Competition and Access to the Bottleneck: The Scope of Contract Carrier Regulation Under the FederalPower and Natural Gas Acts, 18 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 1, 45-46 (1983).
258. 18 C.F.R. § 284.9(f) (1988).
259. NATURAL GAS TRENDS, supra note 182 at 82.
260. Id. at 3.
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between imported natural gas under short-term and long-term contracts
should be reconsidered and eliminated. The market blurs such distinctions and in some cases, spot prices were at par with, or even higher
than, pipeline commodity rates, which are traditionally higher than
spot gas prices.261
The greatest single obstacle to an orderly transition toward marketresponsive natural gas pricing in the United States and Canada is the
threat that openly competitive markets pose to contractual and financial agreements entered into earlier when the industry was more fully
regulated. Under these agreements, pipelines have obligated themselves
to take higher volumes under their long-term contracts than current
market requirements. They are also committed to price levels under
rate structures that have become increasingly uncompetitive with the
fall in oil prices, which has occurred since 1982.
The development of a market-responsive system will be complicated
by the inevitable natural monopoly elements operating at each level
of the industry in both the U.S. and Canada. These factors prevent it
from ever functioning in the manner of free commodity markets existing for some agricultural and mineral commodities, or even to the same
extent that the crude oil market is free.262 Interstate natural gas pipeline systems often do not have competition and will operate as natural
monopolies. Thus, gas transmission will require some degree of traditional regulation in the future. Large industrial and power generation
customers downstream and most producers upstream are the most competitive segments of the industry. The development of open access transportation to directly connect supplier with user offers the hope of
introducing overall market discipline to these segments of the industry. Nonetheless, it will prove easier to introduce effective competition
for natural gas as a commodity than for natural gas transportation.
Contract commitments for the resale to local distribution companies must be firm and supply predictable, otherwise the pipeline cannot be responsible for guaranteeing deliverability. In this context, FERC
efforts to relieve the LDCs of their contract demand responsibilities
through such decisions as Opinion No. 256, Order No. 380, and portions of Order Nos. 436 and 500 have been called "more [a] 'bomb throwof
ing' exercise designed to open up the system, than they are a part
'263
a long-term design for an ongoing market-responsive system.
Regulatorily speaking, we are at a halfway point, where the concern about sanctity of contract and lessening government intervention
has been said to suggest:
261. Id. at 77.
262. Light "Sweet" Crude Oil Future Contract-Cushing,OklahomaDelivery, N.Y.
Mercantile Exchange Guide (CCH) 13,501. Crude oil contracts for future delivery on
the Exchange are sold in units of 1,000 U.S. barrels for delivery in such months as
are determined by the Exchange's Board of Governors.
263. A REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND OPERATIONS OF INTERPROVINCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PIPELINES IN CANADA ENGAGED IN THE BUYING, SELLING AND TRANSMISSION OF NATURAL
GAS, supra note 2 at 80.
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[T]hat pipelines might have two separate supply entities one a system supply company designed to guarantee reliable
supply for the traditional resale business, and a second trading company designed to compete more speculatively in the contract and spot markets with independent transportation. 6 4
Development of these two sides of the pipeline's supply postureguaranteed resale system supply on the one hand and trading on the
other-requires careful segregation to prevent undue risk or monopoly price behavior being transferred selectively to the regulated portions of pipeline business. The current interest in separating the commodity and transportation services of the interstate pipelines represents
a significant shift in market and regulatory preference.
The movement to freer markets in natural gas cannot alter the fact
that most interstate pipelines retain their natural monopoly characteristics. Therefore, the focus of market-responsive pricing must be to
provide open transportation systems for producers to compete directly
for end use business. This level of competition should enable the market to determine prices and through the arbitrage of spot and term contracts send market clearing signals throughout the system.
There are other factors that are equally important to the future
of natural gas use and deregulation and we should not lose sight of
them. While not part of either county's regulatory agenda, they include
the decline in domestic production, environmental controls, and supply security. The decline in domestic proven reserves will continue and
the cost of developing deeper and more expensive resources must be
judged against Canadian supplies that are already connected to the
existing transportation network. Additionally, environmental policies
aimed at coping with a variety of problems linked to air emissions from
fossil fuels could create new markets for natural gas in the next decade
and insulate existing markets from competition from alternate fuels.
For example, the South Coast Air Quality Management District in
California has recommended completely eliminating the use of fuel oil,
distillate, and solid fuels in stationary sources of air pollution (power
plants, industrial boilers, etc.) by 1995.211 The expanded use of natural
gas also serves to address the concern that Canada has repeatedly
expressed to the United States about acid rain.266 The recent development in using Canadian natural gas for U.S. co-generation projects may
make this issue more compelling.
The United States currently imports approximately half of its daily
crude oil requirements. Imported natural gas from Canada is far less
subject to supply disruptions than resources coming from politically
less stable and geographically remote areas. Since natural gas is read264. Id.
NATURAL GAS TRENDS, supra note 182 at 8.
266. Clarkson & Smedon, Effects of Climate Change on Water Resources, 59
F. at 29-31 (Winter 1989).

265.
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ily interchangeable with fuel oil, supplies from Canada are expected
role in backing out any significant increases in
to play an increasing
67
oil imports.1
In closing, imported natural gas is in a transitory and still risky
period. This risk comes from market conditions where the current state
of deregulation has made the industry heavily dependent upon shortterm supply arrangements. Another element of risk comes from the
use of imported natural gas as a supplemental source to meet peak
demands in the face of declining domestic production. While the movement towards decontrol has been healthy, it has focused on the spot
market and short-term solutions. The adoption of the FTA offers a longer
lasting solution for correcting market distortions in cross-border trade
due to governmental policy. If judicial challenges to administrative
initiatives by the FERC and ERA to open up the natural gas system
are successful as they were for Special Marketing Programs in Maryland
Peoples Counsel, and to open access transportation in Order No. 436
in Associated Gas Producers,comprehensive decontrol will have to come
from Congress.

267. U.S.-CANADA GAS

TRADE REVIEW,

supra note 1 at 43.
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